b)
Use of free balloons such as fire balloons elevated by hot air or hydrogen
filled rubber balloons with a device to scatter the balloons automatically.
In
November 1917 tethered kite trials were successful and scattered leaflets were
picked up 10 miles from a kite tethered at 5000 feet. On this basis the War
Office wondered if there were any ways to scatter leaflets onto a target between
100 and 300 miles away. In December 1917 the War Office called for an end to the
experimentation using kites as the General Headquarters France were of the
opinion that the wire tether that the kite was flown from was a potential danger
to aviators in the Flying Corps.
Much
experimentation was done with paper balloons eight feet high filled with
hydrogen and carrying a 4 lb load of propaganda leaflets. To reduce the loss of
hydrogen the paper balloon was covered with a special varnish. The balloon was
equipped with a time-fuse that allowed the leaflets to fall and scatter over a
wide area.
In
practice they were known to travel between ten to fifty miles over the enemy and
release the leaflets en route. In May 1918 the Royal Flying Corps decided to
restart leaflet dropping from aircraft.
In
February 1939 proposals for the distribution of propaganda leaflets from
balloons in the air were discussed. A historical review of the past use of
balloons for propaganda distribution was considered along with the options for
future use. It was initially suggested that a modern propaganda device would
need to reach 10,000 feet and stay afloat for 14 to 16 hours before releasing a
leaflet load of between 6 and 12 lb.
The
origins of this unit derived from just after the Munich crisis the Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief (Air Chief Marshall Sir Edgar Ludlow Hewitt asked the Deputy
Chief of the Airstaff if any actions had been taken to print suitable propaganda
leaflets for release over hostile territory.
He
stated that in his view “skilfully dropped propaganda, distributed by aircraft
might prove a more potent weapon than bombs”.
The
Balloon Development Establishment were asked about using balloons to deliver
leaflets on the basis that the balloons would stay aloft until over the enemy,
burst and drop the propaganda.
The
Committee of Imperial Defence received this letter and Major General Hastings
Ismay. The Foreign Office saw this
as a matter of the “most urgency”.
Bomber
Command at Mildenhall experimented with leaflet dropping. These were successful
but Air Chief Marshall Sir Edgar Ludlow Hewitt was aware that in the Great War
pilots who were dropping leaflets suffered reprisals from the enemy. He then
postulated that unmanned balloons might be used to send leaflets over enemy
territory as had been done in the Great War.
At
the end of August 1938 all investigations into the use of airborne propaganda
were being done by the Air Ministry under Wing Commander D. L. Blackford. On 10th
October 1938 a “Memorandum on the use of the Royal Air Force for dropping
pamphlets over enemy territory”, was issued. This contained the concept of a
special propaganda balloon unit. The Balloon Development Establishment at
Cardington was initially contacted on 17th October 1938 and tasked
with designing and producing a balloon capable of being airborne for six or more
hours and able to carry 6,000 leaflets.
In
May 1939 the Deputy Chiefs of Staff decided that such a balloon unit should be
formed and that initially it was to be sent to France for employment with the
French balloon companies.
In
March 1939 the Balloon Development Establishment at Cardington had successfully
designed, built, tested and flown a balloon system that would do the job. In
June 1939 they added to this a cleverly release mechanism to release the
leaflets. During these experiments the unit went under the title of “P”
Balloon Unit which stood for “Propaganda”. In June 1939 it was considered
that since the use of meteorological balloons was not uncommon the naming of the
new unit as “M” Balloon Unit for “meteorological” would cause less
public curiosity.
The
problem was that a balloon was needed that could travel between France and
Germany while carrying a specific load. The Balloon Development Establishment
was asked to begin tests with a paper-based balloon and the rubber
meteorological type of balloon. Their brief was that the balloon was to be
filled with coal
gas and fly at 10,000 feet for twelve to sixteen hours before releasing
the 12 lb of leaflets.
Neither
balloon was able to meet the brief. The paper one was only good for travelling
ten to fifty miles. The paper was fragile and had to be coated with varnish just
prior to inflation. The rubber meteorological balloons were designed to rise to
around 20,000 to 35,000 feet and then burst. These balloons provided a similar
range of around 50 miles. Neither met the brief.
It
was shown that coal gas was not as good as hydrogen as lifting a propaganda
balloon.
Concern
was expressed in some quarters that the distribution of leaflets falling from a
balloon was haphazard and much sampling of leaflet drops eventually showed that
leaflets dropped from a balloon gave a reasonably tight area of distribution.
In
early 1939, the Balloon Development Establishment (B.D.E). was tasked by the Air
Ministry to try and make changes and improvements to the two balloon formats and
if not possible to start designing a new balloon with a lighter release
mechanism from scratch. It was not until 7th February 1939 that the
vague brief was reformatted with more exacting detail. This specified use of
hydrogen as the lifting gas, a payload of 10lbs and a destination some 500 miles
away. The development work was done on balloons of proofed fabric with all
rubber balloons work being a low priority.
The
10 foot diameter balloon of proofed fabric was designed with tweaks to the
fabric, eventually cost dictated the use of anti-gas fabric (Admiralty D).
The fabric was rubber proofed at the rate of 90gm/M2.
The fabric then weighed 175gm/M2 and the balloon weighed 11.5
to 12 lbs. The first trial flight was done at the National Physical Laboratory
in March 1939.
Radio tracking devices were added, and these also sent out a varied
signal depending on height. This enable height and direction to be monitored.
The
brief was that the balloon should be able to drift in the wind at say 10,000
feet and after 12 hours or so be still sturdy. To keep a balloon at a fixed
height is not easy because as the balloon rises so expands the gas inside. It
will keep rising until the internal pressure gets high enough to cause it to
burst. To prevent this the balloon must have some automatic valve system that
releases gas. Eventually a balloon was created from cotton fabric impregnated
with rubber with a neck for valving purposes.
The
release mechanism was also problematical, and experiments were made with fuses,
clockwork mechanisms and aneroid systems that responded to air pressure. There
was much work to get the right type of balloon along with a mechanism that would
allow the balloons to release their payload at a specific time. Release was
possible with aneroid, clockwork or slow burning fuses. The aneroid devices were
deemed too costly and were abandoned on June 19th, 1939.The release
mechanism was resolved by adapting alarm clock mechanisms and in September 1939
the Air Ministry directly ordered 200 sets for use and conversion into the
release mechanism. These were abandoned as too heavy. The slow burning fuse was
preferred as its simplicity seemed to overcome all the issues presented by
mechanical and aneroid devices.
The
destruction system was tested and adopted on 8th September 1939. This
resulted in the standard balloon being finally agreed to by the Air Ministry.
The
delivery system was based on a rectangular platform slung underneath the balloon
made of wood. On top of the board was a wire sleeve that contained the fuse.
Under the platform was a series of strings that passed through the board and
contact the fuse on top of the board. The strings were then attached to the
leaflet load and ballast bags. The fuse was lit just before the balloon was
launched. The fuse had a slow burning speed set at around nine inches per hour.
As the fuse burnt it burnt through the string and either caused the ballast or
leaflets to drop off at intervals of around an hour. During this time gas would
slowly valve out. As each ballast bag or leaflets fell off this caused the
balloon to return to the equilibrium height. Eventually the final balloon load
was released when the fuse finally burnt through the last string. To protect the
fuse and payload from the weather the area below the balloon was shrouded in a
weatherproof cape.
The
Mark I wire sleeved fuse was modified by placing it on a corrugated cardboard
platform instead of a wooden board. This was cheaper and lighter and was known
as the Mark II fuse. Lessons were learned with each launch. With seasonal
changes it was realised that in the winter the winds were much faster which
meant the balloon would reach the target area sooner and so the fuse was
shortened to a five-hour duration. The strings were also changed to withstand
the stronger winds. Balloons equipped with the five-hour fuse were able to carry
less ballast but more leaflets.
In
June 1939 the Air Ministry had approved all the design of the balloon and the
fusing system and 1,000 balloons were ordered. The fabric used was the same as
used in typewriter ribbon and these early balloons were costing £7-10s each.
Later cheaper cotton fabric impregnated with rubber was adopted and the balloon
was made from the same material that the admiralty had used for meteorological
balloons.
There
was concern that the balloon would end up in enemy hands and so there was a
modification that once the final load had been dropped the fuse set of a small
flash charge that burst the balloon.
On
14th June 1939 the director of war organisation was asked by the Air
Staff to make suitable arrangements to form on mobilisation a special balloon
unit on the lines of the provisional establishment based on the provisional
establishment of august 1938. The initial establishment was
fifteen airmen who would make up the unit and would have four lorries and
a car. It was arranged that on mobilisation the unit would be sent to Nancy,
France without supporting transport on Z +2 Day (Two days after mobilisation).
It was to be attached to the French balloon companies until the balloon
transport could be sent over.
From
14th to 31st August the Balloon Unit personnel,
were sent to R.A.F. Station Cardington where they were trained in the use
of the “M” balloons and associated equipment. Finally, the unit was made up
of one
officer trained in meteorological work, one Sergeant, four Corporals and 15
other ranks, made into “bricks” of four men each, with drivers and clerks.
If the officer in charge was not familiar with French, then the establishment
had to have an additional Corporal interpreter.
The
unit could release 36 balloons per hour. With war an almost certain outcome the
Balloon Unit was moved on 31st August to R.A.F. Station Abingdon,
Oxfordshire in readiness for being sent to France.
French
Operations
On
31st August an initial supply of balloons and equipment was
despatched to the Officer Commanding Balloon Group, French Army at Epinal. It
had been intended to supply enough balloon to last through 3 weeks of activity.
But the declaration of war made that impossible.On 2nd December the
unit moved by road from Abingdon to Southampton and embarked with the first
contingent of the Advanced Air Striking Force. Disembarking at Le Havre they
travelled by road to the village of Foug, near Toul, near Nancy. The aerodrome
at Toul Crouc de Mets was now Headquarters of the Advanced Air Striking Force
and became the main supply source of balloon unit supplies. Due to
administrative issues, it was only on the 1st October that the
Balloon Unit was able to begin operations properly. They sent sixty balloons
containing 180,000 leaflets to targets 100 miles inside Germany. However, that
was not without incident. The weather was freezing, and the balloons froze. It
was learned from that one launching that the men needed to be provided with hot
food and hot drinks to function properly.
The
leaflets were given various abbreviated names and the two historic leaflets
despatched that night were EH.280 and EH.158.
EH.280
entitled “Achtung!” (“Attention”), was simply a copy of the 3rd
September 1939 radio speech made by Chamberlain intended for the German nation.
It emphasised that the Britain was not at war with the German people, but they
were at war with the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler.
EH.158
entitled “Das sind eure Führer!” (“These are your Leaders!”), was an
attempt to convince the German people that Nazi leaders such as Himmler, Goering,
Goebbels, had deposited vast amounts of money in foreign banks. The leaflet
appears to have been a mixture of news items from America.
The
Gestapo were very keen to collect any of these leaflets in an attempt to stop
them getting into the hands of the public. One of their records reveals that
they found the leaflet EH.280 as far as Nuremberg the following day.
The
launching revealed that the quality control on the balloons and equipment was
not good. Some balloons had issues with a tiny protruding tag that was designed
to attach the destructive flash had not been added to the balloon in
manufacture. The flash had to be secured to the balloon using pieces of string.
The load-bearing ring that held the payload of leaflets was inadequate in that
it was “not strong enough for the load they had to bear”.
By
the middle of October 1939, the weather was very wet. Consequently, the Balloon
Unit did not let up any firther “M” balloons through October.
The
site at Foug was a quagmire and road transport was impossible.
A move was authorised to a Chateau at Schneckenbusch,
near Sarrebourg (mis-spelled in official papers as Schickenbusch!).
A
hangar at Buhl aerodrome was provide for operational activities. A launching
site was established by clearing some woodland. In November 1939, ten operations
were successful to let up 547 “M” balloons. It was calculated that the
number of leaflets was as high as one million. Operations continued here until
May 1940.
All
operations in the war were subject to review. They had to be efficient,
effective and value for money. It is clear that the Cabinet Office as early as
November 1939 had doubts about the worthiness of the operations of “M”
Balloon Unit. When one considers the concept of the “M” Balloon Unit it
certainly looked somewhat like a “Heath-Robinson” operation. The concept of
sending leaflets on a balloon at the unpredictability of the winds was certainly
a weak point when compared to the accuracy provided by aircraft dropping
leaflets. However, at that stage in the war it was believed that the balloons
could travel considerable distances into the various occupied countries. These
“M” balloons were often delivering leaflets further into occupied countries
than aircraft could at that time. The Balloon Unit was defended by the Head of
the Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries. He considered them to be a great
value, despite the limitations on
their accuracy due to them being reliant on the winds. He highlighted
that the scattering of propaganda leaflets was causing much embarrassment to the
Gestapo and the collection of the leaflets was using up many enemy man-hours.
Sir
Campbell Stuart, who was head of the Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries,
(often known as Department E.H.) assured the Cabinet Office, at the end of
November, of the value of balloons to
distribute
propaganda but conceded that they did have some limitations.
“There
is not, of course, the same control of direction; but even though numbers of the
leaflets may be scattered over country areas, there is satisfaction in knowing
that, in this event, they present a particularly embarrassing problem to the
Gestapo. Moreover, there may be strokes of luck. On the 8th November, for
instance, a number of balloon-borne leaflets fell over the towns of Chemnitz and
Freiberg
at a time when the inhabitants were on their way to work.”
The
average number of balloons issued was 60 balloons at each launching and they
sent 4,516,000 leaflets from the site. New balloons, leaflets and equipment were
flown in, and hydrogen was provided by the French as Epinal using a mixture of
French cylinders and British low pressure cylinders.
In
December 1939 only four operations were successfully launched and the atrocious
winter weather, with the winds being unfavourable, meant that in January 1940 it
was freezing and only two successful launches were made.
The
Unit continued operating in France whenever the right meteorological conditions
prevailed. Sometimes only a few releases a month could be made because the wind
was blowing in the wrong direction or not at a constant speed.
For
instance, in January 1940 on only two occasions was the wind favourable for
sending off balloons and was intensely cold, the temperature falling to -8° F.
As
the Balloon Unit had considerable down time. When not getting balloon operations
ready they were “loaned out” to the local people to help with the
construction of air raid defences. They also spent time checking the quality of
the balloons to weed out any defective balloons and arrange repairs as
necessary.
When
the Unit could not operate, the men were given other duties, like digging A.R.P.
trenches and checking the seams of balloons and other equipment. With the rapid
advance of Wehrmacht forces across Europe and into France, the Unit began to
retreat, moving to Nantes in mid-May 1940. By the 1st June, they escaped from
the Continent and returned to Cardington in England, where they reformed under
the command of Flight-Lieutenant H.S. Elton, M.C. The advances of the German
army into France raised concerns. They were despatched to Nantes as a
precautionary measure. On 17th May 1940 the military situation was
critical, and it was evident that German forces were in some cases a day or two
away. The unit was in danger of being overrun. They embarked at Cherbourg and
disembarked at Dover and then to R.A.F. Station, Uxbridge. From there the
Balloon Unit was sent to R.A.F. Station Cardington where it was transferred to
Balloon Command and commanded by Flight-Lieutenant H.S. Elton, M.C..
In
the summer of 1940 Western Europe was by and large occupied by the Nazis. It was
realised that these people needed a vast amount of support from Britain in terms
of information and news. It was planned to utilise the European Radio Service of
the BBC supported by the information provided by the Department of Publicity in
Enemy Countries.
To
bolster this, it was decided that aircraft and balloons would need to drop
leaflets and propaganda newspapers. The content of these was often replicated by
the resistance for distribution by the resistance groups in each country.
Because
most of Western Europe had been occupied, the Department of Publicity in Enemy
Countries workload greatly increased, as they now had to sustain the morale of
the populations in the various occupied countries. This was mainly achieved by
sending them fast, reliable news through the European
Service
of the B.B.C. and was supplemented by newspapers, and other leaflets,
distributed by aircraft and balloon. The leaflets were often used for the
production of underground newspapers by resistance movements within the occupied
territories. Each country had their own editions of newspapers, airdropped from
Britain; the main one for France was titled “Le Courrier de l’air” and was
regularly issued from December 1940 until the Liberation.
Holland
received its first leaflets dropped by propaganda balloons in October 1940,
Belgium in November and France in December. When the Luftwaffe turned their
attentions towards Britain, the Unit did not escape its bombing.
It
was decided that for best operational reasons R.A.F. Station Manston, near
Ramsgate, Kent was ideal for future work by “M” Balloon Unit. The prevailing
winds here were west and north-west which were ideal for propaganda balloons.
They arrived on 5th July 1940 and began to set up operational systems
in readiness. They were signalled to begin leaflet ballooning from 2000 hours on
14th July 1940.
The
occupation of much of Europe by the Germans meant that balloon operations could
be sent over a wider geographical area than had been when the Balloon Unit was
in France.
The
people in the occupied countries were subjected to severe rules, radios were
confiscated, listening to any foreign broadcasts was prohibited, newspapers were
tightly censored. The British government realised that in order to raise morale
and negate the fabricated Nazi version of news these people needed to be
informed by other means of the reality of events in other parts of the world.
The
Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office were responsible for all
the propaganda the was to be sent to both enemy and countries occupied by the
enemy. It was busy producing newspapers for distribution in Belgium and France
and any enemy occupied country. There were not enough aircraft spare to make
dedicated leaflet drops. Leaflet dropping was low priority compared to bombing
operations.
This
was where “M” Balloon Unit was seen as having a great advantage as with the
right winds it could send newspapers and leaflets to France, Germany, Belgium
and Holland and other areas that needed help with information on what was
happening elsewhere in the world.
On
the night of 16th to 17th July 1940 the first balloons
were let up at Manston for targets north-west of Paris this continued until 14th
August 1940. At this date there was considerable attacks on airfields by the
Luftwaffe and Manston was singled out for an attack at the start of the Battle
of Britain.
On
24th August 1940 a heavy dive-bombing attack took place in the late
morning. Two bombs made direct hits on the hangar and stores used by the Balloon
Unit and was set on fire. The only items that survived the attack was one 3-ton
lorry, one 15-cwt van, a number of loaded hydrogen trailers and a pair of
scissors. All of the stores of leaflets were burnt. Four airmen bravely entered
the hangar during a Luftwaffe machine gun strafing to remove the hydrogen
cylinders to a place of relative safety. These were Flight-Sergeant Price,
Sergeant Topps, Corporal McNeill and Leading Aircraftman Quayle who were
commended for their actions by Area Officer Commanding Balloon Command.
It
was evident that Manston was no longer safe for the Balloon Unit, and
it temporarily moved to the village of Birchington about 3 miles from
Manston. It later moved to No.1 Balloon Centre Kidbrooke where it was
re-equipped and then on 19th September moved back to Birchington and
occupied Grenham House School. The school grounds gave a superb launching site.
The Unit was ready b to begin operations on 11th October 1940.
However bad weather delayed operations until
the late hours of the 31st October 1940.
Extra personnel combined with an excellent launching site meant that the
monthly leaflet drops averaged 1,500,000 leaflets.
The
Balloon Unit sent their first propaganda balloons to Holland in October 1940,
Belgium in November 1940 and France in December 1940.
Between
31st January 1941 and 9th April 1941 a series of test
flights with cards were carried out by the Balloon Unit. Each test from Manston
was undertaken when the winds were from the East. At each test 5 balloons were
released with cards requesting returning to the Air Ministry.
This
was to
test.
a)
the accuracy and thus reliability of the predicted weather forecast for the
winds
it
was found that it was not unusual for the winds to have a variance of 90 degrees
from that forecast and the distances travelled could be 33% less than predicted.
b)
working of fuse
releases and fuses for flash destructive devices
the fuses worked very well in
80% of the cases
c)
efficient carrying of loads
the loads were carried efficiently
d)
area covered by ballast releases
a distribution of leaflets was excellent within a circular area 8 miles
in diameter
e)
proportion of leaflets likely to be found
19 to 26% of the cards dropped were returned. This was good considering
that the majority of drops were in rural areas. In April1941 cards were still
being found from the tests in January 1941.
In
February 1941 a new record was reached with 1,407 balloons released carrying
3,062,000 leaflets.
Throughout
1941 they continued successfully to distribute leaflets but did have a few
problems with faulty and wayward balloons. On several occasions, balloons with
their leaflet cargo still attached were washed ashore along the east coast of
England, after crashing into the North Sea. The suggested reason for these
accidents was the string suspending a ballast load only being charred and not
totally burnt through by the fuse. As the ballast had not been dropped, the
balloon descended into the sea. On the whole, it was considered, by Flight
Lieutenant J.M. Woodcock, who took command of the Unit in July, that the “M”
balloon equipment gave about 80% effective functioning, which was thought to be
satisfactory.
Through
1941 the Balloon Unit continued operations. Quality control was again found to
have been poor. A number of balloons were washed up where the ballasting had
failed to separate from the balloon. This was blamed on faulty fuse burning.
Even so, Flying Officer J. M. Woodcock was of the optimistic opinion that only 1
in 5 balloons failed to deliver as intended.
|
Using balloons as a
means of delivering propaganda was always an inaccurate, unpredictable
method. On occasions, the extent to which they missed their intended
targets was unacceptable. For instance, in March 1941, several balloons
were released, their target being Belfort in eastern France. Some actually
dropped their leaflets in Switzerland, Italy and Navarre in Spain, about
650 miles away! An independent report commissioned highlighted their
inaccuracy; only 60% of the balloons released reached Germany, 65%
reaching France, 25% Belgium and none making it to Holland. This poor
accuracy was blamed on inadequate meteorological reports. As a result, a
new type of weather forecast, called a “Papyrus” report, was issued
which helped to improve the prediction
|
Further
Development
Flying
Officer J. M. Woodcock was responsible to the Air Ministry for the work the
Balloon Unit did.
The
Air Ministry Branches were “Plans 5”, Later renamed P.R. 7 and later Deputy
Directorate of Propaganda. It was declared that each operation had to be a
minimum of 200 balloons to be let up.
The
skill and experience showed that three crews of seven men were able to inflate,
load and release a balloon every 40 seconds. Seven of the airmen involved were
extremely keen on the work and began experimenting and tweaking the existing
system to achieve different results.
The
release mechanism in use was a Mark II version and these tweaks produced the
excellent Mark III version that enabled balloons to travel along with the wind
for 5 hours before releasing their maximum load. The Balloon Development
Establishment at Cardington approved the new design in November 1941, and it was
brought into use and was used until the Balloon Unit was disbanded. Using
balloons as a means of delivering propaganda was always an inaccurate,
unpredictable method. On occasions, the extent to which they missed their
intended targets was unacceptable. For instance, in March 1941, several balloons
were released, their target being Belfort in eastern France. Some actually
dropped their leaflets in Switzerland, Italy and Navarre in Spain, about 650
miles away! An independent report commissioned highlighted their inaccuracy.
only
60% of the balloons released reached Germany, 65% reaching France, 25% Belgium
and none making it to Holland. This poor accuracy was blamed on inadequate
meteorological reports. As a result, a new type of weather forecast, called a
“Papyrus” report, was issued which helped to improve the predication of a
balloons flight.
The
balloon destination was always dependant on the winds being consistent for the
period during which the balloons were aloft. The meteorological reports were
relied on to make the decision when to let up the balloons and what destination
they would be sent to. In March 1941 there was much embarrassment when balloons
intended for Belfort in the eastern area of France ended up in Spain, Italy and
even Switzerland.
Much
careful research went into the accuracy of the destination the balloons let up
by the Balloon Unit.
A
special report revealed that the accuracy was not good.
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