D-day
Exercises- Operation “Prank” March 1944
The
whole plan for D-day relied on establishing relatively safe Beachheads which
would enable men and weaponry to access the Normandy beaches and move inland. In
the various campaigns in Italy, Sicily and North Africa much had been learned
about balloons and beach
landings. However it was essential that the beach landing in Operation Overlord
be as successful as possible. It was decided to run a full scale exercise to
test the ability of the Beach Balloon Units to land, establish balloon sites and
rapidly let up balloons to defend from air attack a series of sites on a beach.
No.51 Beach Balloon Unit was chosen to practice a first assault on a
sandy beach. This gave the troops involved experience of
a “wet shod” landing, and the embarkation and carrying of
balloons on Landing Craft. Balloons were embarked from the Admiralty
Hards and in an effort to provide a low radar signal it decided to fly the Mk VI
balloons in two groups, one group flying from the point of attachment on the
Landing Craft rail which equated to zero feet and the other group at 100 feet.
The
exercise was begun on 7th March 1944 when two Landing craft had a
balloon each which was attached to the Landing Craft rail which equated to zero
feet. On 8th March 1944 a further 18 balloons were due to be embarked
but severe winds meant that not a single balloon could be embarked at the
Admiralty Hards at zero feet or 100 feet. To try and make the exercise work the
Barrage Balloon Squadrons from Portsmouth were ordered at first light, to ferry
the balloons by small craft directly to the Landing Craft at their anchorages.
This enabled 24 balloons to be flown at 100 feet on strops. The two balloons
previously attached to the Landing Craft rail on 7th March 1944
became casualties. It became obvious that the disembarking of the Light Portable
Winch with two men was very difficult as it weighed around 240 lb, and as a
result on the 8th March 1944 each Landing Craft with a balloon
carried two men and a Light Portable Winch drum only. The two Bedford 4 X 4
vehicles that were also embarked were loaded with Light Portable Winches on the
scale of two winches per
five balloons.
A
reconnaissance party consisting of one Flying Officer and five
N.C.O.’S embarked on a Landing Craft Infantry with a light
Anti-aircraft reconnaissance party.
On
the 9th March the convoy
sailed at 2000 hours, on beaching the reconnaissance party chose suitable
balloon sites and waited on the shore to guide the balloon beach crews to the
selected balloon site. The first Landing Craft arrived on the beach at 0830
hours and all 24 balloons were got ashore. The majority of crews got ashore
“dryshod” on the top of army vehicles. The balloons were raised from the
winch drums using a crowbar as a spindle. The first balloon was at operational
height within 15 minutes of landing and by 1400 hours all the balloons were
ashore and at operating height. There had been a delay in landing the balloon
servicing vehicles and the Beach Balloon Unit Commander. This meant that at last
light it was impossible to get any balloons down until the servicing vehicles
were ashore. They finally landed at 2100 hours and four balloons were
close-hauled by Light Portable Winch or flexible drive on the vehicles. The
remainder of the balloons were left flying on orders of the Beach Commander.
On
the 10th of March 1944 all balloons were hauled down and deflated,
packed up and returned to their stations by road. This ended Exercise
“Prank”.
There
were lessons learned:-
1.
The balloons could not be easily transported by attachment to the rail of the
Landing Craft.
2.Even
in the event of fine weather it was doubtful that balloons could not be flown
successfully at 100 feet and it was thought that 300 feet might be better and
this needed investigation.
3.If
the ground speed of the wind was over 30 m.p.h. it was thought that embarkation
of balloons at any height was not possible. It was decided to experiment with
ways of ferrying balloons to the Landing Craft at their rendezvous anchorages,
when the weather permitted.
4.If
balloons were embarked from the Admiralty Hards at 300 feet or over they could
be attached to the Admiralty Winch on board the Landing Craft and hauled down to
100 feet for the voyage in an effort to avoid radar signals.
4.It
was realised that if the Landing Craft were moored at their rendezvous for more
than 48 hours before sailing, the balloons on eventually landing, will not be as
efficient as they could be. Hydrogen loss was likely. They would need topping up
before the convoy sailed. It would be possible to have a hydrogen cylinder on
board but the exercise of topping up on a Landing Craft would be very difficult
unless the sea was dead calm.
5.This
meant that the only solution was to ensure that balloons were only embarked
during the 24 hours before the convoy sails. This also means that the concept of
ferrying balloons and
transferring them to a Landing Craft needed to be explored and given serious
consideration.
6.This
exercise showed
that whatever embarkation procedure was finally adopted, the organising of the
rigging, inflation and embarkation of balloons would entail detailed planning in
liaison with the many different services and authorities on the spot. Such
planning and organising had to take place while the Beach Ballooon Unit with its
Officers and vehicles were in the Marshalling yards or Concentration areas.
Balloon Command had to ensure there were competent Officers, preferably at the
rank of Squadron Leader, temporarily available
during the period D-8 to D to assume responsibility for producing the balloons
in perfect condition to the Beach Balloon unit crews on the correct craft and at
the right moment. This needed close liason with the local Naval and Military
Authorities.
7.Once
the Landing Craft were clear of the shore and the wind eddies produced by dock
installations, no undue difficulty was to be anticipated with the balloons. In
light winds the balloons could fly at 100 feet but in moderate to strong winds
they would need a clearance to fly at 300 feet to decrease the risk of loss.
8.The
actual beach landing was to be carried out by co-operation between the R.A.F.
balloon crews and the other personell on board the Landing Craft. Balloon crews
could get ashore on any vehicle leaving the Landing Craft. If the vehicle became
swamped with water and inoperable the balloon crews could still wade ashore with
the balloon.
9.Provided
the reconnaissance party had selected a good site the balloons should be at full
operational height within 15 to 30 minutes of beaching depending on the distance
from the landing point.
10.Exercise
“Prank” showed that two airmen could not get a Light Portable Winch ashore
unaided. The winch would delay the beaching of the balloon and as a result the
balloon was to be brought ashore with only the winch drum and a crowbar used as
a spindle to enable the balloon to be let up to operating height.
11.The
balloon servicing vehicles were to be carrying two Light Portable Winches per
five balloons and once these vehicles were ashore the use of the winches could
then begin. These vehicles had to cross the channel on the same wave as the
balloons. Exercise “Prank” showed that there was a risk of vehicles not
getting ashore on time due to Landing Craft issues and this risk had to be
minimised by phasing forward the third vehicle of each Beach Balloon Unit to the
same wave. This vehicle was to have two winches per five balloons.
12.Beach
congestion was to be avoided and a reconnaissance party of one officer and five
N.C.O.’s was essential. This would reduce the number of personnel available to
transport and land the balloons. If 240 balloons were to be landed the initial
landing would be limited to 200 balloons. This should be acceptable as the
balloon protection for Mulberry was not needed until D+1 at the earliest. The
efficiency of the balloons would be increased if sufficient Hydrogen cylinders
could be got across with the initial balloons.
13.Provided
the three vehicles per thirty balloons could be phased into the initial wave
some fifteen Hydrogen cylinders might be carried. It was no exaggeration that
this might well make the difference between success and failure, should bad
weather interfere with the supply of inflated balloons flown over from this
country.
14.To
minimise the reduction in the number of balloons landed owing to the necessity
for a reconnaissance party it was essential that drivers or additional balloon
operators should be established for each of the three vehicles.
15.The
major problem for Balloon Command was that the inflated balloons had to be
provided and embarked at the right time and in the right place and in the
correct quantities in the face of possible weather hazards. It was thus
essential that Balloon Command knew
·
the Admiralty
Hards from which the Beach Balloon Unit balloons
would embark.
·
The
number of balloons to be embarked from each Hard.
·
The
rendezvous anchorages for the Landing Craft after leaving the Hards.
Once
this information was known Headquarters had to temporarily lay on enough fully
competent Officers to deal with the many problems that were bound to arise at
each point of embarkation.
It
could not be ruled out that it would be needed to ferry balloons out to get them
onto a Landing Craft safely and in prime condition for the Operation, and the
provision of the craft and location of the necessary personnel needed to be
investigated thoroughly and the number of craft needed had to be calculated. A
fast craft making 20 knots could ferry out up to 20 balloons per day if the
distance between the balloon inflation point and the Landing Craft anchorage was
less than five miles offshore.
This
was the analysis of those involved in assessing exercise “Prank”. It seems
that nobody questioned what would happen to these plans if those landing on the
beaches came under fire and come under fire they did. It is hard to decide if
the planning authorities were being naïve or had decided not to consider this
in official documents to prevent possible panic and loss of troop morale.
One
outcome of some the balloon delivery for D-day was to introduce Operation
Plumtree where a vessel was anchored offshore with a number of balloons inflated
and awaiting collection. The balloons could then be picked up one at a time by
Landing Craft and was likened to picking plums off a tree, hence the name
Plumtree.
On
the 24th March 1944, D-day was just nine weeks away and a Memorandum
was issued stating the position as known at the time.
Eight
Beach Units of 30 balloons had been formed and trained within Balloon Command
but only seven had been established and the remaining Unit was being
established. It seems the 21 Army Group had not actually given in their request
for balloon protection but it was suggested that they would require balloon
protection of sixty balloons to each Beach Squadron area, plus an additional
sixty for protection of the Mulberry area. Suggesting that 240 balloons would be
needed.
The
Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force was asked about how soon after the
initial assault balloons could be flown across the Channel without the British
prematurely giving away their intentions to the enemy.
The Radar experts had explained that the balloons could only be flown at
100 feet when 7 miles behind the initial assault wave. It was expected that 105
balloons could be sent on the first tide and 115 balloons on the second tide.
As D-day unfolded it was ruled that as soon as landing strips were operational there would be specific balloon restrictions in place. No balloons were to be flown within 2,000 yards of any landing strip. There was to be an approach funnel at the end of each strip and there was to be no obstruction from balloons above a 1 in 20 start line from the rear end of the strip. Balloon cables at the inner edges of this funnel were to be marked with coloured Streamers at 100 feet intervals and then at 500 feet intervals above 500 feet. Balloons were not to be flown higher than 500 feet below the lowest cloud base.
Before
the arrival of the Headquarters 2nd Tactical Air Force on the
Continent the following Beach Squadrons, Beach Balloon Squadrons and Balloon
Flights were to be in place.
Beach
Squadrons Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were to be phased in by the Army and go in with the
assault.
Beach
Squadron No.4 was held in reserve at Old Sarum.
Beach
Balloon Squadron No. 974 was to go in with No.2 Beach Squadron.
Beach
Balloon Squadron No. 976 was to go in with No.1 Beach Squadron.
Beach
Balloon Squadron No. 980 was to go in with No.4 Beach Squadron.
Beach
Balloon Squadron No. 991 was for Mulberry and was to go in on D-day + 4.
Port
Balloon Flight No.104 for Yapton was to go in on D-day + 6.
Port
Balloon Flight No.103 for Croxdale was to go in on D-day + 20.
The
following Forces using various
Landing Craft arriving on D-day would fly R.A.F. balloons.
Force |
Landing Craft
Number |
Port of
Loading |
J |
24 L.C.T |
Stokes Bay |
J |
22 L.S.T. |
Southampton |
G |
No L.C.T. |
N/A |
G |
22 L.S.T. |
Southampton |
G |
3 L.S.T. |
Gosport |
S |
53 L.C.T. |
Stokes Bay,
Gosport, Newhaven |
(L.S.T.
means Landing Ship Tank and L.C.T. means Landing Craft Tank )
The
potential for success of the D-day invasion was always questionable but the
balloon protection provided, despite many issues and difficulties, was
undoubtedly a major reason for the success of Operation Overlord.
Peter
Garwood 2023